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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the California legislature added significantly to 
the State Labor Code when it passed the Private Attorney 
General Act (PAGA).1  PAGA was enacted as a response to the 
growing disparity between California’s large labor force and 
the increasingly finite staff of the state’s enforcement 
agencies.2  The PAGA successfully narrowed this gap by 
permitting any aggrieved employee—current or former—to 
bring an action on behalf of other similarly situated employees 
against their employer for a violation of the California Labor 
Code.3  Essentially, the statute allows employees to step into 
the shoes of an attorney general and seek redress because the 
 
 1.  CAL. LAB. CODE  § 2698 (West 2004). 
 2.  See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 6 
(July 29, 2004). 
 3.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2004).  See generally Ben Nicholson, 
Business Beware: Chapter 906 Deputizes 17 Million Private Attorneys General to 
Enforce the Labor Code, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 581, 583 (2004). 
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state is fiscally unable to do so on their behalf.4 
Since its enactment in 2004,5 “it has become common 
practice for plaintiffs in employment actions to assert a PAGA 
claim, as the potential civil penalties for violations can be 
staggering and often greatly outweigh any actual damages.”6  
Annual PAGA filings have increased over 200 percent in the 
last five years, and over 400 percent since 2004.7  The fact that 
PAGA claims cannot be waived by agreements to arbitrate 
contributes heavily to the prevalence of these suits.8  Its 
popularity also comes from PAGA’s nature as a representative 
action, permitting aggrieved employees to sue on behalf of 
other employees; this can often make for a very large group of 
employees as plaintiffs, not unlike a class-action suit.9   
 
 4.  See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 5–
6 (July 29, 2004). 
 5.  The original statute was enacted in 2003 and the amended version in 
2004.  See Erich Shiners, Chapter 221: A Necessary But Incomplete Revision Of 
The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 882 
(2005) (explaining that three new provisions were added in the 2004 amendment, 
two were aimed at limiting the potential for frivolous lawsuits under PAGA, and 
the other to decrease potentially disproportionate penalty awards). 
 6.  Robyn Ridler Aoyagi & Christopher J Pallanch, The PAGA Problem: The 
Unsettled State of PAGA Law Isn’t Good for Anyone, BENDER’S CALIFORNIA 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN, No. 7 July 1, 2013. 
 7.  See Matthew M. Sonne & Kevin P. Jackson, Sheppard Mullin Richter & 
Hampton, Towards a “Manageability” Standard in PAGA Discovery, ASS’N OF 
BUSINESS TRIAL LAWYERS REP., Vol. XVI, No.3 (Summer 2014). 
 8.  See Iskanian v. CLS Transp., Los Angeles, LLC., 59 Cal. 4th 348, 388–89 
(2014) (explaining that because PAGA claims attempt to “vindicate the Labor and 
Workforce Development Agency in interest in enforcing the labor code,” such 
claims do not interfere with the Federal Arbitration Act, and accordingly, not 
subject to waiver through agreements to arbitrate).  Class action claims, in 
contrast, are subject to waiver through agreements to arbitrate.  See AT&T 
Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).  However, despite Iskanian, 
some district courts in California have refused to bar the waiver of PAGA 
representative actions.  These courts reason that the PAGA waiver issue is one 
of federal law and Iskanian is merely a state court’s interpretation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).  As such, they argue they are not bound by Iskanian, and 
conclude that the “rule making PAGA claim waivers unenforceable is preempted 
by the FAA.”  Fardig v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., No.SACV 14-00561 JVS (ANx), 
2014 WL 4782618 at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014).  See also Nanavati v. Adecco 
USA, Inc., No. 14-cv-04145-BLF, 2015 WL 1738152 * 6–9, (N.D. Cal. April. 13, 
2015) (holding that FAA preempted rule against waiver of PAGA representative 
action, and collecting district court cases finding Iskanian persuasive and 
unpersuasive). 
 9.  See generally Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 
1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (representative PAGA claim brought with over 800 
plaintiffs); Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 
2014) (representative PAGA claim brought with a class size over 100). 
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Indeed, PAGA claims often accompany class-action claims, 
and, after Arias v. Superior Court, can be pursued when a class 
cannot be established.10  In that case, the court held that 
representative PAGA claims are not subject to the 
requirements of California Code of Procedure section 382,11 
California’s class-action statute, because of PAGA’s purpose as 
a law enforcement action.12 
Although PAGA actions are not subject to section 382, 
PAGA suits are still representative actions in nature and 
seemingly parallel the class action model.13 Due to the 
similarities, courts have been wary of encountering class action 
problems in PAGA suits and have even dismissed PAGA claims 
for grounds normally only associated with class actions, i.e., 
manageability.14  Manageability was developed as a concept to 
assess class actions, but its utilization in PAGA ultimately 
prevents concerns inherent in any large representative action: 
the adjudication of individualized issues resulting in (1) 
numerous hearings on individualized questions of law and fact, 
thus wasting scarce judicial resources; or (2) the adoption of 
“substantive, procedural, or evidentiary short-cuts around 
such hearings.”15 
Even those these concerns exist, not all courts have 
recognized the applicability of the manageability concept in 
California.16  As a result, it is unclear whether a plaintiff can 
 
 10.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009) 
 11.  California Code of Civil Procedure section 382 requires three elements: 
“[1] the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, [2] a well-
defined community of interest, and [3] substantial benefits from certification that 
render proceeding as a class action superior to the alternatives.”  Brinker 
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021 (Cal. 2012). 
 12.  See id. at 1017 (affirming Court of Appeals judgment that representative 
claims under PAGA were not subject to class action requirements).  See also 
Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.) (“[T]he 
California Supreme Court has . . . [held] that PAGA actions are not class actions 
under state law.  The court found PAGA actions fundamentally different from 
class actions, chiefly because the statutory suits are essentially law enforcement 
actions”) (citation omitted). 
 13.  Sonne  & Jackson, supra note 7. 
 14.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (dismissing PAGA claim because 
individual issues made the action unmanageable).  The presence of individual 
issues is part of the community of interest requirement.  See supra note 10. 
 15.  Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach 
to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2005). 
 16.  See Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx), 2012 
WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012) (holding that a finding of 
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bring a PAGA claim without fear of it being dismissed as 
unmanageable at trial, and on the defendant’s side, whether 
they can attack a PAGA action on grounds of manageability.  
This uncertainty gives rise to the following question: at what 
point, if at all, should a court dismiss a PAGA claim containing 
hundreds, or even thousands, of employees with many 
individualized questions of fact and law on grounds of 
unmanageability?  This Comment will explore this question 
and assert that notwithstanding the court’s holding in Arias,17 
PAGA claims should necessarily be subject to manageability 
limitations, and dismissed when such limitations are 
exceeded.18 
Part I of this Comment introduces the historic origins of 
PAGA, its legislative history, and its substantive reach and 
procedural scope.19  Additionally, Part I examines the seminal 
case, Arias v. Superior Court and class action wage-and-hour 
decisions that have implications for similar PAGA claims.20  
Lastly, unmanageability will be introduced, and the dissension 
in the California federal courts regarding PAGA, FRCP Rule 
23, and unmanageability will be explored.21  Part II identifies 
the problems inherent in failing to control the manageability 
of large, complex PAGA actions.22  Part III analyzes why the 
courts have the ability to dismiss PAGA claims as 
unmanageable, and why this is the most advisable course.23  
Part IV proposes a useable test in determining if a PAGA 
representative action would be unmanageable while litigating 
the claim.24 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legislative History 
Prior to the enactment of PAGA, the enforcement 
departments of the State Labor and Workforce Development 
 
unmanageability because of the presence of individualized questions would 
obliterate the purpose of PAGA). 
 17.  See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 19.  See discussion infra Part I.A.-B. 
 20.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 21.  See discussion infra Part I.D–E. 
 22.  See discussion infra Part II. 
 23.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 24.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
5_GOODMAN FINAL 3/25/2016  9:35 AM 
418 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Agency (LWDA) failed to effectively enforce labor law 
violations.25  This ineffectuality stemmed from the combination 
of a growing economy and severe budgetary shortfalls.26  To 
help remedy this problem and crack down on the increasing 
number of labor law violations in a growing labor market, the 
legislature enacted PAGA; this effectively deputized more than 
17 million workers to enforce the labor laws themselves.27  
Simultaneously, PAGA alleviated budgetary problems by 
increasing the flow of cash going into labor law enforcement: 
the statute provides that 75% of any award be recovered by the 
LWDA.28  The remaining 25% is split among all the similarly 
situated employees.29 
PAGA did not come without opponents, however, and this 
Comment seeks to address one of the early criticisms made 
upon the statue’s enactment: the ability of employees to sue 
their employers on behalf of a class without having to fulfill 
class certification requirements.30 
Employers also voiced concerns, arguing that PAGA would 
disproportionately favor employees and work to the detriment 
of already overburdened employers.31  Specifically, they argued 
it was unfair that employee-plaintiffs could recover attorney’s 
fees while employers could not.32  Moreover, they posited the 
enactment “adds to an already unfriendly business climate in 
 
 25.  SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 at 6 
(September 10, 2003).  One study concluded that at the pace the Division of Labor 
Enforcement (DSLE) was investigating labor violations in California restaurants, 
it would take over 100 hundred years to inspect each and every restaurant in 
California.  See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 582. 
 26.  See Nicholson, supra note 3, at 582. 
 27.  See Nicholson, supra note 3 at 582.  See also Halliwell v. A-T Solutions, 
983 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1182 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“The California legislature enacted 
PAGA to ‘allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorney generals, to 
recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations when the labor law enforcement 
agencies could not keep pace with the growth of the labor market’”) (citing Arias 
v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (2009)). 
 28.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2014) (the money is also used for the 
education of employers and employees regarding their rights under the labor 
code); Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc., 202 Cal. App.4th 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]he 
relief [from PAGA] is in large part for the benefit of the general public rather than 
the party brining the action.”). 
 29.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(i) (West 2014). 
 30.  SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 at 7 (Sept. 
10, 2003). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
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the state by encouraging suits against employers.”33  Broader 
policy implications were also asserted—opponents feared 
PAGA litigation and penalties could potentially increase 
business costs, thus resulting in an exodus of business to states 
with more employer friendly laws.34 
Other concerns included the unnecessary litigation of 
claims for minor violations, such as the size of font in an 
arbitration agreement,35and the trial court’s lack of ability to 
reduce excessive penalties for such violations.36  Fortunately 
for employers, these two particular concerns of abuse were 
quickly curbed as the legislature followed up the original 
statute with an Amendment in 2004.37  The same cannot be 
said of the other issues opponents voiced criticism about, and 
these concerns have been left to the courts to work out.38  
Specifically, the issues regarding the inapplicability of class 
action requirements for PAGA representative suits—asserted 
back in 2003—remain, and are the focus of this Comment. 
B. Substantive and Procedural Scope of the PAGA 
1. The Substantive Reach of the PAGA 
The reach of the statute is simple: it allows a private action 
to be brought for the violation of numerous labor code 
provisions.39  Penalties may not be awarded for mere technical 
violations of the Labor Code, such as any violation of a posting, 
notice, agency reporting, or filing requirement.40  Once an 
appropriate provision is sued under, the employee need only 
 
 33.  See Nicholson, supra note 3 at 585. 
 34.  See Shiners, supra note 5, at 881. 
 35.  See Lenora M. Schloss & Carl A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor 
Code Private Attorneys General Act, 28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 13. 
 36.  See Shiners, supra note 5, at 888. 
 37. See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (explaining that although some steps 
have been taken to curb the abuse the opponents feared, “the legislature has left 
PAGA to the courts to work out the details of its application in practice.”). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  The relevant provisions are contained in section 2699.5. See CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 2699.5 (West 2014). 
 40. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(2) (West 2014). See Lenora M. Schloss & Carl 
A. Cohorn, Assessing the Amended Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, 28 
LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 14 (calling § 2699(g)(2)—which was part of 
the PAGA amendment in 2004—the single most important change to PAGA 
because it eliminated a provision in the 2003 bill allowing for suits to be brought 
for harmless technical violations). 
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show that a violation occurred, not that they were actually 
harmed by the violation.41 
Additionally, an “aggrieved employee” may bring an action 
“on behalf of . . . other current or former employees against 
whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.”42  
An “aggrieved employee” is defined as a person who was 
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or 
more of the alleged violations were committed.43  But, the 
employee cannot bring suit if the LWDA decides to file a suit 
covering the same alleged misconduct.44 
Notably, the statute contains no class action 
requirements, and, as mentioned above, PAGA representative 
actions are not required to meet class action requirements.45  
Thus, PAGA potentially functions as a “back-door” route to a 
class action lawsuit, which greatly increases the potential 
liability for an employer-defendant.46 
2. Penalties and Attorney’s Fees within PAGA 
The remedy provision in the PAGA statute functions as a 
default remedy available when no pre-existing civil penalty in 
the labor code exists.47  If the default remedy applies, the civil 
penalty is $500 dollars if the person does not employ one or 
more employees.48  If the person employees one or more 
employees, the penalty is “one hundred dollars . . . for each 
aggrieved employee pay period for the initial violation and two 
hundred dollars . . . for each aggrieved employee per pay period 
 
 41.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2014); Shiners, supra note 5, at 879 
(“[T]he act apparently does not require the employees to demonstrate actual 
harm.”). 
 42.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West 2014). 
 43.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(c) (West 2014). 
 44.  CAL. LAB. CODE  § 2699(h) (West 2014). 
 45.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009). 
 46.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 13. 
 47.  Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 4th 210, 222 
(Ct. App. 2010) (applying PAGA penalty because no statutory penalty existed for 
violations of seating requirements in wage order promulgated by the Industrial 
Welfare Commission); see also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2., 163 Cal. App.4th 
1157, 1206–07 (Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that violations of Labor Code § 210—
failure to make payments—are not subject to PAGA default remedy because the 
provision provides its own penalty). 
 48.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(1) (West 2014). 
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for each subsequent violation.”49  The 2004 amendment50 (SB 
1809) added a provision designed to limit excessive liability 
imposed: trial courts were given discretion to reduce the civil 
penalty amount when “to do otherwise would [result in an 
award that is] unfair, arbitrary and oppressive, or 
confiscatory.”51 
Another highly contested area of PAGA involves the 
provision on attorney’s fees: any employee who succeeds in his 
or her action is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s 
fees and costs.52  The attorney collects the full amount of these 
fees although the prevailing plaintiff only receives twenty-five 
percent of the penalties.53  The impact of this provision is 
further magnified because typical wage and hour cases (the 
most common type of PAGA action)54 routinely generate fees in 
excess of $100,000.55 Thus, there is much incentive for 
plaintiff’s attorneys to bring these suits because the attorney’s 
fees can be quite large.56 
3. Administrative and Notice Requirements 
Before any PAGA action may be brought, certain 
administrative remedies must be exhausted.  An employee 
must first notify his or her employer and the appropriate state 
agency of the specific Labor Code violation.57  The next step 
 
 49.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014). Cf. Cal. Lab. Code § 210(a)(2) 
(West 2014) (imposing a $200 dollar penalty for subsequent violations of failing 
to make a payment, or any willful or intentional violation, plus 25 percent of the 
illegally withheld amount). 
 50.  See Shiners, supra note 5. 
 51.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(e)(2) (West 2014).  See generally ASSEMBLY 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1809, at 5 (June 22, 2004) 
(explaining that this new provision was enacted to address the concern that the 
previous bill “provided no discretion to reduce penalties under the law and that 
significant inadvertent violations could lead to astronomical penalties”). 
 52.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(1) (West 2014). 
 53.  Shiners, supra note 5, at 890.  See generally ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796 (June 26, 2003) (opponents argued 
that this provision would lead to frivolous lawsuits with low penalty recoveries 
but high attorneys’ fees). 
 54.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16. 
 55.  See Lippold v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., No. C 10-00421 SI, 2010 WL 
1526441, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting cases). 
 56.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 13 (explaining that PAGA has 
become known among employers and the defense bar as the “Bounty Hunter 
Law”). 
 57.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(1) (West 2014). 
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depends on the type of labor law violation because there are 
three categories of violations and they each have their own 
implications.58  To pursue a violation in the first category, 
which includes over 150 provisions specified in section 2699.5, 
the employee must notify the LWDA and wait thirty-three 
days for that agency to decide if they want to investigate the 
claim.59  If they do not pursue the violation, the employee may 
commence a civil action pursuant to section 2699.60 
The second category consists of health and safety 
violations contained within the California Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1973.61  This category does not provide for 
private lawsuits; the Department of Occupational Safety and 
Health (DOSH) must inspect the workplace and issue a 
citation.62 
The last category contains all labor code provisions that do 
not fall under the aforementioned categories.63  To bring a suit 
in this category, an employee must first notify the employer 
and the LWDA of the suspected violation as well as the legal 
theories and facts supporting the violation.64  Then, the 
employer may cure65 the alleged violation within a thirty-three 
day timeframe.  If the violation is not cured, the employee can 
file a civil action.66 
C. The PAGA–Class Action Nexus 
1. Arias v. Superior Court 
Prior to Arias, it was clear PAGA actions could be brought 
as class actions.67  However, after Arias, it was clear that 
 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(2)(A) (West 2014). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14. 
 62.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14. 
 63.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14. 
 64.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 14. 
 65.  This “cure provision” was added in the 2004 amendment and will likely 
effectively reduce the litigation of less serious Labor Code infractions.  Notably, 
employers are only allowed three cures per year for the same violation.  See 
Shiners, supra note 5, at 887. 
 66.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(2)(A) (West 2014).  If the violation is deemed 
cured by the enforcement agency, the employee can appeal that decision to the 
LWDA and then the superior court.  See generally Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 
40, at 15–16. 
 67.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 930 n.5 (Cal. 2009) (emphasis 
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PAGA actions do not need to satisfy the state class action 
requirements, which operates as a major benefit for employees 
wanting to bring large suits.68  The court affirmed the lower 
court’s holding, which relied on the language of the statute,69 
comparisons of the statutory language within section 17204 of 
the Business and Professions Code70 and section 17203 of the 
Unfair Competition Law,71 and most importantly, the purpose 
of a PAGA suit.72  Additionally, the high court addressed three 
of the defendant’s arguments. 
The most colorable argument asserted that failing to apply 
class action requirements would violate an employer’s right to 
due process.73  Specifically, non-party aggrieved employees 
 
added). 
 68.  Id. at 926.  See generally CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 382 (West 2014) (a 
person may bring a class action when “the question is one of a common or general 
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is 
impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . .”); Brinker Restaurant Corp. 
v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 523 (Cal. 2012) (“The party advocating class 
treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently 
numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits 
from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”); 
Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 1069, 1089 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he 
community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant 
questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical 
of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the 
class.”) (citation omitted). 
 69.  The “notwithstanding any other provision of law” language indicates that 
PAGA actions could be brought without meeting the class action requirements.  
Arias v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 4th 777, 779 (Ct. App. 2007), review 
granted and opinion superseded by 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009). 
 70.  The language in the PAGA statute was similar to section 17204, which 
permitted representative actions that were not brought as class actions; thus, the 
same should be permitted for PAGA actions.  See Arias, 209 P.3d at 930. 
 71.  Section 17203 of the UCL explicitly requires that representative actions 
brought under that statute comply with the class action statute—section 382 of 
the California Code of Civil Procedure.  In contrast, the PAGA statute does not 
contain such language and, as such, does not require the same elements be met.  
See id. 
 72.  The purpose being to “protect the public and penalize the defendant for 
past illegal conduct.”  Arias v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Ct. App. 
2007) (review granted and opinion superseded by 46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009)).  This 
indicates that PAGA claims need not be brought as class action. 
 73.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932.  The other two arguments the 
defense asserted were: (1) not requiring the class action elements would lead to 
absurd results; and (2) the PAGA legislative history reveals an intent that any 
PAGA claim be brought as a class action.  The first was dismissed because it was 
unsupported by the language of the statute, and the second because it was 
unsupported by the legislative history—the committee report comments did not 
explicitly refer to class actions.  See id. at 930-32. 
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would be able to profit from the judgment of a prevailing 
plaintiff-employee through the use of collateral estoppel, but 
would not be bound following an adverse judgment because 
“they were not given notice of the action or afforded any 
opportunity to be heard . . . .”74  Thus, the defendants argued 
that a one-way collateral estoppel violated their right to due 
process because they would be “bound by the judgment as to 
remedies other than civil penalties.”75  If PAGA is “construed 
as requiring representative actions under the act to be brought 
as class actions” however, this result would be avoided.76 
The high court concluded that no due process violation was 
at stake because of the nature of PAGA actions.77  The 
California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Kennard, 
reasoned that because a PAGA action “is designed to protect 
the public, and the potential impact on remedies other than 
civil penalties is ancillary to the action’s primary objective, the 
one-way operation of collateral estoppel in this limited 
situation does not violate the employer’s right to due process of 
law.”78 
The implications of this decision are enormous.  For one, it 
eases the process of bringing a PAGA representative action 
compared to a parallel class action.  Secondly, by allowing 
employees to obtain non-penalty remedies through collateral 
estoppel, Arias increased the effect a PAGA representative 
action could have on employer liability.79 
2. The Increased Need for PAGA Representative 
Actions After Recent California State and Federal 
Court Decisions 
As stated above, PAGA actions are much less demanding 
than class actions after Arias.  Still, given the choice, plaintiffs 
are better off pursuing a class action claim relative to a PAGA 
representative action: PAGA mandates that seventy-five 
percent of any civil penalties be distributed to the LWDA, 
 
 74.  Id. at 934. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 933. 
 77.  Id. at 934. 
 78.  Id. at 934. 
 79.  JUDITH M. KLEIN ET AL., CAL. BUS. LAW DESKBOOK § 16:28 (2014) 
(explaining that after, a PAGA representative action can have a substantial 
impact beyond PAGA’s statutory civil penalties). 
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while plaintiffs and their attorney(s) in a class action receive 
the entire amount of any penalty.80  After a variety of decisions, 
however, class claims—and specifically class claims for wage 
and hour violations81—have become more difficult to pursue, 
thus increasing the attractiveness of pursuing a PAGA 
action.82 
The California Supreme Court decision Brinker 
Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court,83 held that employers need 
to only provide meal breaks, and not police them, “triggering 
the need for an individualized inquiry for most meal and rest 
break claims . . . .”84 The more individualized inquiries there 
are, the lower the chance of class certification because common 
issues of law or fact will not predominate over individual 
issues—an important factor in the class action “community of 
interest” prong.85 
Duran v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.86 similarly made obtaining 
class action certification more difficult.  There, the court 
determined that statistical evidence could not “be used as a 
substitute for establishing commonality or for avoiding 
individualized determination of individual issue[s] . . . .”87  
 
 80.  See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (arguing that because 75% of a 
recovery would flow to the LWDA, there is a strong incentive to allocate 
settlement proceeds towards class action claims). 
 81.  Wage and hour claims are the most common type of PAGA action.  See 
Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16. 
 82.  See Schloss and Cohorn, supra note 40, at 16. 
 83.  Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004 (Cal. 2012). 
 84.  See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6; see also Schiller v. David’s Bridal, 
Inc., No. 1:10–cv–00616–AWI–SKO, 2012 WL 2117001 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 
(explaining that the Brinker decision made class certification for missed meal 
breaks more difficult). 
 85.  See Brinker Restaurant Corp., 53 Cal.4th at 1022 (Cal. 2012). The other 
two factors in the community of interest prong are “class representatives with 
claims or defenses typical of the class . . . and . . . class representatives who can 
adequately represent the class.”  Id. at 1021. 
 86.  Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 59 Cal.4th 1, 50 (Cal. 2014) (remanding 
to lower court to determine whether loan officers working for U.S. bank were 
misclassified as exempt employees outside salespeople under section 1171 of the 
California Labor Code). 
 87.  GUIDE TO MULTISTATE LITIGATION § 2.2 n. 7 (2014) (citing Duran, 325 
P.3d at 922).  See also Duran, 325 P.3d at 933 (“There must be some glue that 
binds class members together apart from statistical evidence.”).  Commentators 
have noted that this decision will likely result in a more even playing field for 
employers contesting certification of employee class actions.  Kevin Lilly, 
California Supreme Court Stabilizes The Law In State Misclassification Class 
Actions, 21 NO. 6 WESTLAW JOURNAL CLASS ACTION 1, 2 (2014). 
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Statistical proof is only appropriate if the trial plan can firmly 
establish how individual issues can be managed at trial.88  
Thus, without being able to utilize statistical evidence, 
plaintiffs will have a more difficult time certifying a class. 
In the federal courts, Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Dukes89 gave bite 
to the commonality requirement for Rule 23 and section 382 
class certification.90  The Supreme Court heightened the 
commonality requirement by stating a plaintiff must identify 
among the class a common injury and common questions 
deemed central to the dispute.91  Additionally, the Court held 
that Trial By Formula technique is not a permissible method 
for determining individualized damages.92  The unavailability 
of this technique provides further incentive for Plaintiff’s to 
forgo costly and difficult means of obtaining class certification, 
and, instead, focus on a PAGA claim. 
These cases have made obtaining class action certification 
more difficult in California state court and federal court, and 
consequently increased the attractiveness of PAGA claims.93  
 
 88.  See Duran, 325 P.3d at 933–34. 
 89.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 90.  See id. at 2551.  In federal court, the commonality requirement is 
distinct from the predominance requirement.  In California state court, the 
predominance requirement is an element within the commonality prong.  
Compare 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1763 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the 
differences between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3), the 
predominance requirement, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)(2), 
the common issues of fact and law requirement), with Duran, 325 P.3d at 930–31 
(explaining that a plaintiff must show common issues of fact predominate as part 
of the community of interest prong). 
 91.  Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (2011).  The “centrality” principle has been 
applied in California state court.  See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court 221 
Cal.App.4th 1353, 1368 (2013) (applying Dukes and holding that the common 
issues must be central to the dispute). 
For an argument criticizing the Dukes requirement of “centrality,” see A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access 
to Justice, 93. B.U. L.REV. 441 (2013). 
 92.  Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2561. The Trial By Formula technique permits 
individualized claims to be resolved through sample cases extrapolated to the 
claims of the entire remaining class; thus, it makes class claims more manageable 
by obviating the need for extensive individualized inquiry.  Id. 
 93.  See also Comcast Corporation v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) 
(explaining that a plaintiff needs to be prepared to prove the requirements of Rule 
23(a), it is not merely a pleading standard, also, the Court found that plaintiff’s 
expert evidence, in and of itself, cannot satisfy predominance under FRCP Rule 
23(b)(3)); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729 
(2013) (arguing that in recent years, courts have made it more difficult for 
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Unsurprisingly, California plaintiffs will most likely pursue 
PAGA claims instead of class actions in the future.94  The 
decisions also are relevant for PAGA because these principles 
are useful when assessing the manageability of the actions.95 
D. PAGA In The Federal Courts 
1. Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 Apply to 
PAGA Claims Within Federal Court? 
As was made clear in Arias, California Code of Civil 
Procedure section 382 does not apply to PAGA claims in 
California state court.96  However, the holding did not settle 
whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to PAGA in 
California federal courts.  The answer is crucial.  If answered 
in the affirmative, Arias will be unable to assist a Plaintiff 
seeking to bring a PAGA representative action that typically 
would be denied as a class action. 
Additionally, with the emergence of the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA), all class actions exceeding $5 million 
must be brought in federal court.97  Many class action claims 
are joined with PAGA claims;98 thus, if the class claim is 
removed to federal court, the PAGA claim will be too.  This 
increases the importance of the Rule 23 inquiry.99 
The answer to this question, however, is decidedly mixed 
and brings much uncertainty for both PAGA plaintiffs and 
defendants in a federal court action.  The courts finding that 
Rule 23 does apply to PAGA representative actions follow the 
reasoning of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
 
plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits). 
 94.  Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6. 
 95.  See Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 
117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (citing Duran when discussing the 
availability of statistical evidence to establish liability for the PAGA claim). 
 96.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 926. 
 97.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2014). 
 98.  See Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 (explaining that “PAGA claims  have 
tended to ride the coattails of traditional class action claims”). 
 99.  The PAGA claim follows because of the doctrine of supplemental 
jurisdiction.  See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (3d ed. 2010) (“Supplemental 
jurisdiction can be justified only if the supplemental claim is so closely related to 
the jurisdiction-invoking claim that they are part of the same case or 
controversy,” which is satisfied if they share a common nucleus of operative fact) 
(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). 
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Allstate Ins. Co.100  There, the United States Supreme Court 
decided that because Rule 23 regulates procedure, it 
automatically applies in all civil actions in the district courts 
“regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.”101  
As such, plaintiffs must still meet the requirement of Rule 23 
when there is a state statute regulating procedure.102  
Following this analysis, a minority of California district courts 
have determined that because PAGA permits recovery for 
unnamed parties, it is essentially a procedural mechanism “by 
which litigants may recover for absent plaintiffs, akin to a class 
action,” and thus, Rule 23 applies.103 
The majority of California federal courts have reached the 
opposite conclusion.104  These courts distinguish PAGA as a 
procedural mechanism by reasoning that its purpose as a 
public protecting, law-enforcement statute transcends its 
procedural character.105  Moreover, PAGA does not confer a 
private benefit onto the plaintiff and the represented 
employees—the benefit falls upon the public.106 
Further support for Rule 23’s non-applicability is found in 
the recent 9th Circuit decision Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services 
 
 100.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 599 U.S. 
393 (2010) (addressing the interplay between a New York statute limiting the 
availability of relief under class actions and Rule 23). 
 101.  Id. at 1444. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Fields v. QSP, Inc., No. CV 12-1238 CAS (PJWx), 2012 WL 2049528, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012); see also Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, 
AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 943 (2009) (holding that PAGA does 
not create any property rights or other substantive rights, it is simply a 
procedural statute permitting an aggrieved employee to recover statutory 
penalties); Thompson v. APM Terminals Pacific Ltd., No. C10-00677 JSW, 2010 
WL 6309364, at *2 (N.D. Cal. August 26, 2010) (PAGA claim in federal court must 
meet requirements of Rule 23); Ivey v. Apogen Technologies, No. 11CV366 DMS 
NLS, 2011 WL 3515936, at *3 (S.D. Cal. August 10, 2011) (explaining that 
because section 2699(a) provides for the recovery of unnamed parties, it 
contravenes federal procedural requirements and Rule 23 applies). 
 104. See, e.g., Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 
1338297, at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Sample v. Big Lot Stores, Inc., No. C10-03276 SBA, 2010 WL 4939992, 
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010); see also McKenzie v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 765 
F.Supp.2d 1222, 1234 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that Rule 23 does not apply to 
Class Actions and that this view is consistent with Arias); Cardenas v. McLane 
Foodservice, Inc., No. SACV 10-473 DOC (FFMx), 2011 WL 379413, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 31, 2011). 
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Corp.107  The 9th Circuit reasoned that because Rule 23 and 
PAGA are more dissimilar than alike, PAGA claims could not 
establish federal court jurisdiction under CAFA.108  At least 
one lower court has interpreted this holding as resolving the 
question of whether Rule 23 applies to PAGA representative 
actions.109 
This split creates undesirable uncertainty in the law for 
parties—but mainly employers—litigating a PAGA 
representative action.110  Nonetheless, Rule 23 most likely will 
not apply to PAGA in Federal District Court, significantly 
easing the burden for plaintiffs in bringing their 
representative actions.  However, there is still one lingering 
concept—well established in class action jurisprudence—that 
still poses an issue in PAGA cases: unmanageability. 
E. Unmanageability and its Role in PAGA Suits 
1. What Is Unmanageability? 
There exists a “commonly accepted rule of class actions: if 
the [action] is ‘unmanageable,’ it should be dismissed.”111  
Courts look towards manageability to assess whether a court 
can fairly and efficiently conduct a trial, or whether its 
magnitude and complexity prevent a fair adjudication.112  It 
“ultimately involves a judgment concerning the usefulness of 
the expenditure of judicial resources entailed in the litigation 
 
 107.  Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 108.  Id. at 1124 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 109.  Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 1338297, 
at *20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014). But see Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. 
C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (recognizing 
that Baumann supports the distinction between PAGA and Rule 23 class actions, 
but does not decide the issue); Halliwell v. A-T Solutions, 2014 WL 4472724, at 
*3 (S.D. Cal Sep. 10, 2014). 
 110.  TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. 
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxx (2d 
ed. 2011) (discussing the issues that stem from uncertainty in the law for 
employers). 
 111.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 761 (Cal. 1976) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting).  In federal court, one of the considerations in determining 
whether class certification is appropriate is possible difficulties in managing a 
class suit.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (West 2014). 
 112.  In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 148 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating 
and remanding lower court’s order granting class certification because common 
issues did not predominate over individual ones, making the class 
unmanageable). 
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of a class action . . . .”113 
Manageability has often been subsumed in the 
predominance class action requirement, which requires that 
common issues of fact and law predominate over individual 
issues.114 Manageability can also be a consideration in other 
elements as well.115  Unmanageability “may be reflected by 
such matters as the size or contentiousness of the class . . . or 
the presence of special individual issues.”116  If enough 
evidence of unmanageability is found, the court denies class 
certification because going forward with the claim would 
transform the litigation into an enormous burden on the court’s 
resources, unable to be effectively managed or controlled.117 
Unlike in federal court—where manageability is explicitly 
mentioned in Rule 23—section 382 says nothing of 
manageability.118  Nonetheless, the concept of manageability is 
 
 113.  Note, Developments in the Law—Class Action: Fundamental 
Requirements for Class Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1499 (1976).  See also Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974) (explaining that manageability 
“encompasses the whole range of practical problems that may render the class 
action format inappropriate for a particular suit.”). 
 114.  See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 325 P.3d 916, 930–31 (Cal. 2014) 
(explaining that assessing the manageability of litigating individual issues is 
connected to the predominance inquiry, which is part of the community of interest 
prong); 7AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the 
manageability consideration and its ability to help the court “in determining 
whether questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate . . . .”). 
 115.  A leading treatise considers the manageability inquiry as part of the 
superiority requirement.  See, e.g., WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & 
HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that 
manageability is the most critical concern “in determining whether a class action 
is a superior means of adjudication”).  It has also been considered part of the 
ascertainability requirement.  See, e.g., Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849 (Ct. App. 2003) (“Manageability . . . is 
intertwined . . . with the question of ascertainability . . . ”) (quoting Reyes v. 
Board of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1275 (1987)). 
 116.  7AA CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780 (3d ed. 2010).  See also 1 WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72 
(5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he cases most likely to be unmanageable are those involving 
myriad individual issues . . . .”). 
 117.  In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91–92  (9th Cir. 1972) 
(reversing class certification because of unmanageability due to the 
predominance of individual questions, high administrative costs, and 
complexity). 
 118.  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (West 2014) (stating that in 
assessing the predominance of common issues of law and fact with individual 
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firmly rooted in California case law; it was first recognized in 
Diamond v. General Motors Corp.119  In Diamond, class 
certification was denied because the proceeding would be 
unmanageable due to many individualized issues.120  Shortly 
after, another unmanageable class action was dismissed when 
the community of interest requirement was not met.121 
The California Supreme Court first dismissed a class 
action as unmanageable in Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior 
Court.122  The court weighed the potential of plaintiff’s 
recovery—which was insubstantial—with the expensive 
administrative costs in identifying and processing claims.123  
Finding that substantial benefits did not accrue to the litigants 
and the court alike, the court dismissed the action as 
unmanageable.124  The court did not dismiss for the presence 
of individual issues like the two previous cases; instead, the 
court intertwined manageability with weighing the burdens 
and benefits of the class action.125  Notably, this manageability 
weighing assessment has been considered a factor distinct 
from the other more traditional requirements.126 
Since PAGA representative actions are not subject to class 
action certification, the manageability assessment is gaining 
popularity because it concerns judicial economy and the 
efficiency of actions.127  As the next section details, considering 
 
issues of law and fact, the court should look at “the likely difficulties in managing 
the class), with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2014). 
 119.  Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 377–78 (Ct. App. 
1971). 
 120.  Id. (denying class certification, in part, because there were many 
individualized issues). 
 121.  Devidian v. Automotive Service Dealers Assn., 35 Cal. App. 3d. 978, 985 
(1973) (holding that there was no manageable community of interest). 
 122. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755, 758-59 (Cal. 1976). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See RUTTER GROUP, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL Ch. 14-
B 14:17.8 (2014) (identifying the weighing assessment as an “other factor” 
germane to class certification); see also Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 1275 (Ct. App. 1987) (considering the 
manageability inquiry as part of ascertainability but also—and distinctly—an 
underlying admonishment of the Supreme Court to “weigh the respective benefits 
and burdens of a class action . . . .”). 
 127.  See e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (dismissing PAGA action as 
unmanageable because too many individualized assessments would be needed at 
trial). 
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manageability is proper because courts are have inherent 
power to control their dockets when judicial economy is 
implicated. 
2. A Court’s Ability to Control Its Docket 
Connected to the manageability issue is a court’s “inherent 
power to control [its] dockets.”128  It has been long recognized 
that California courts “have inherent equity, supervisory, and 
administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control 
litigation before them.”129  With this power, the courts are 
permitted to “[fashion] new forms of procedures when required 
to deal with the rights of the parties and manage the caseload 
of the court.”130  These powers comport with the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which are to be administered in order to 
secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”131 
Due to the complexity and size accompanying PAGA 
actions, the potential to clog up the courts with PAGA actions 
is large.  Thus, the court’s inherent power to control its docket 
becomes paramount.132  Some courts have begun to utilize 
these inherent powers, and assess manageability when faced 
with complex PAGA claims.133 
3. Unmanageability in Action: PAGA Suits in 
Federal Court 
Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s holding 
that PAGA suits are fundamentally different than a class 
 
 128.  Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 
(9th Cir. 1986).  See generally Sonne  & Jackson, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing that 
the courts inherent power to control its docket is connected to manageability). 
 129.  Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 130.  Id.; see also Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 
App. 3d 272, 287 (Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that these powers are “‘derived from 
the historic power of equity courts’ and ‘supervisory or administrative powers 
which all courts possess to enable them to carry out their duties’”) (quoting 
Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 (1978)). 
 131.  FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Defendants’ Motion To Strike  Any Class, 
Collective, or Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & 
Co. Inc, 2014 WL 5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (No. CV. 14-0425 PA 
(PJWx) (arguing that dismissing unmanageable PAGA representative action 
secures the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the present action, 
while not obliterating the purpose of PAGA). 
 132.  See Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7. 
 133.  See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
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action134—and thus not subject to class action 
requirements135—courts have been willing to dismiss PAGA 
claims for lack of manageability.136  Other courts, however, 
reach the opposite conclusion and are unwilling to dismiss for 
unmanageability, reasoning it would obliterate PAGA’s 
purpose to “incentivize private parties to recover civil penalties 
for the government that otherwise may not have been assessed 
and collected by overburdened state enforcement agencies.”137  
These cases are discussed below. 
In Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., an extremely large PAGA 
representative action,138 the court determined the Plaintiff did 
not need to satisfy the class action requirements of Rule 23.139  
Nonetheless, the court found that the PAGA claim was 
unmanageable because it required too many individualized 
assessments.140  The court noted that manageability issues 
were magnified in this wage and hour case because the 
plaintiffs had not shifted the burden to the defendant to 
counter liability.  The result would have been to require the 
plaintiff to demonstrate liability as to thousands of individual 
aggrieved employees.141 
The same result was reached in Litty v. Merrill Lynch, 
where the court granted a motion to strike the plaintiff’s PAGA 
 
 134.  Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 135.  See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 136.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL , 2014 
WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (“[T]he Court does not conclude that 
PAGA claims are unmanageable in general, but only that the circumstances of 
this case make the PAGA claim here unmanageable because a multitude of 
individualized assessments would be necessary.”). 
 137.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHx), 2012 WL 
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal.  Sept. 20, 2012). 
 138.  The case involved thousands of employees in over 850 stores.  See 
Defendants’ Motion to Strike PAGA Representative Actions Allegations at 13, 
Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2014 WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) 
(No. CV 12-05859 EDL). 
 139.  Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2014 WL 117614, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 
19,2014).  See supra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
 140.  Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014).  The action involved claims for compensation for 
off-the-clock work, unreimbursed mileage, and under-reimbursed mileage, all of 
which would require highly individualized questions.  Id. at *4–5. 
 141.  Id. Cf. Alcantar v. Hobart Service, No. ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 
WL 146323, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan 14. 2013) (highly individualized, fact-intensive, 
mini-trials not likely because the burden was on the Defendants to prove “that 
they kept adequate records of meal breaks or relieved employees of their duties”). 
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representative action for wage and hour claims.142  After 
initially rejecting class certification because individualized 
issues predominated, the court determined “[t]he 
circumstances of this case make the PAGA claim 
unmanageable because a multitude of individualized 
assessments would be necessary.”143  Interestingly, in both 
cases, the courts applied Arias.144  Nonetheless, both judges 
still dismissed the claims as unmanageable because of 
numerous individualized issues of fact and law: a result 
commonly reached when rejecting class action certification.145 
Importantly, recent cases have continued to rely on Litty 
& Ortiz.146  These courts have similarly held that PAGA 
representative actions are unmanageable when there are a 
large number of allegedly aggrieved individuals who would 
require a multitude of individual assessments to prove 
liability.147 
 
 142.  Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV 14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014).  This case, like Ortiz, would have 
involved the individualized inquiries of thousands of employees.  See Defendants’ 
Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or Representative Actions or Claims at 
21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV. 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014). 
 143.  Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., No. CV 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014). 
 144.  See Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C–12–05859 EDL, 2014 WL 
117614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) (recognizing that PAGA actions do not 
need to meet class action requirements in state court and federal court after 
Arias); Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, CV 14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 
5904904, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (dismissing for unmanageability even if 
the Arias holding applies to PAGA representative actions in federal court). 
 145.  See, e.g., Elliot v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 585–86 (N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(denying class certification in a Truth in Lending Act claim because the number 
of individual fact issues would make the litigation unmanageable); In re Fosamax 
Products Liability Litigation, 248 F.R.D. 389, 403–04 (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (denying 
class certification on products liability claim because the amount of individual 
questions would make the action unmanageable). 
 146.  See Raphael v. Tesoro Refining and Marketing Co. LLC, No. 2:15-cv-
02862-ODW, 2015 WL 5680310, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 25, 2015)(holding that 
PAGA claim was unmanageable and inappropriate because “[t]he Court would 
have to engage in a multitude of individualized inquiries. . . .”); Amey v. 
Cinemark USA Inc., No. 13-cv-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504, at *16–18  (N.D. 
Cal. May 13, 2015)(dismissing PAGA claim when it would require “too great a 
number of individualized assessments. . . .”); Bowers v. First Student Inc, Inc., 
No.2:14-CV-8866-ODW (Ex), 2015 WL 1862914, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2015) 
(striking PAGA representative claim because it involved a multitude of 
individualized assessments). 
 147.  Amey v. Cinemark USA Inc., No. 13-cv-05669-WHO, 2015 WL 2251504, 
at *16–17  (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015); Bowers v. First Student Inc.,  No.2:14-CV-
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Lastly, in Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp. a PAGA group 
consisting of eighty-eight employees alleged fifteen separate 
Labor Code violations as to each employee, thus confronting 
the court with over 1,000 alleged Labor Code violations.148  The 
court ultimately dismissed the PAGA action because it was not 
persuaded the plaintiff could establish the claims with common 
proof—a class action necessity.149  Although the court did not 
explicitly dismiss the claim for lack of manageability, that 
conclusion is commonly reached when questions of fact and 
law, capable of common proof, do not exist.150 
These cases illustrate courts are willing to dismiss a PAGA 
action if the suit would be unmanageable, which is a class 
action concept.  However, because Arias seemingly dictates 
otherwise, it is no surprise that there are cases, such as 
Plaisted v. Dress Barns, which have concluded that striking or 
dismissing a PAGA suit as unmanageable is inappropriate.151 
In reaching its conclusion, the Plaisted court addressed 
the defendant’s contentions regarding the unmanageability of 
the PAGA claim.152  The defendant asserted that “courts 
regularly decline to allow ‘representative actions’ to proceed 
where the claims require individualized factual 
determinations, and individualized calculation of damages 
that are more than nominal amounts.”153 
In addressing the first contention, the court recognized 
that PAGA’s purpose is to incentivize employees to sue 
employers for labor violations and recover penalties for the 
government.154  This purpose would be obliterated if a PAGA 
action could not be maintained due to individual assessments 
 
8866-ODW (Ex), 2015 WL 1862914, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 23, 2015) 
 148.  Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09cv2063-CAB (NLS), 2013 WL 
9988381, at *2 (S.D. Cal.  Feb. 15, 2013). 
 149. Rix v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 09cv2063-CAB (NLS), 2013 WL 
9988381, at *2 (S.D. Cal.  Feb. 15, 2013).  “The need for common proof dovetails 
with the Rule 23 requirements of commonality and predominance.”  Marlo v. 
United Parcel Services, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 476, 484 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 150.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 335 (3d. Cir 
2011)(“A key question in a litigation class action is manageability—how the case 
can and will be tried, and whether there are questions of fact or law that are 
capable of common proof”) (emphasis added). 
 151.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx) 2012 WL 
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
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because “every PAGA action in some way requires some 
individualized assessment regarding whether a Labor Code 
violation has occurred.”155  The court was not persuaded by the 
second argument involving calculations because the cases the 
defendant relied upon involved individualized restitution 
calculations under California’s Unfair Competition Law 
(UCL).  Restitution calculations, unlike the calculations 
needed here, are extremely fact-intensive and 
individualized.156  In contrast, violating PAGA results in the 
recovery of statutory penalties in fixed amounts.157  Therefore, 
the manageability problems inherent in a UCL case were not 
present in the PAGA claim here, and the defendant’s motion 
for judgment on the pleadings was denied.158 
Another case that failed to strike a potentially 
unmanageable claim was Echavez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. 
Inc.159  In addressing the defendants’ manageability argument, 
the court recognized the plaintiff would have difficulty 
establishing liability, which would be required for each 
individual she was seeking to recover on behalf of.160  In similar 
fashion to the Plaisted decision, the court held that this was 
not a reason to strike a claim.161 
All in all, the defendants in each of the above-mentioned 
cases expressed a similar concern: the difficulty and 
subsequent unmanageability in proving individual issues for 
many employees at trial.  However, different results ensued.  
Ortiz even cited the Plaisted statement regarding the 
obliteration of the purpose of PAGA and still reached a 
different result.162  
 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-01679-ODW(SHx) 2012 WL 
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012). 
 158.  Id. at *2–3. 
 159.  Echavez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. Inc., No. CV 11-9754 GAF (PJWx), 
2013 WL 7162011, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at *11.  (The court approvingly cited Plaisted for the proposition that 
PAGA’s purpose would be obliterated if a court ruled that a case was 
unmanageable because of individual assessments). 
 162.  Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, 2014 WL 117614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
March 19, 2014) (“To hold that a PAGA action could not be maintained because 
the individual assessments regarding whether a violation had occurred would 
make the claim unmanageable at trial would obliterate [PAGA’s] purpose, as 
every PAGA action . . . requires some individualized assessment . . . .”) (quoting 
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This dissension within California district courts creates a 
shroud of uncertainty for parties in a PAGA representative 
action.  Such “uncertainty in the law can inflict real costs on 
employers, not only ex-post (litigation expenses and 
unexpected liabilities) but also ex-ante (in terms of risk 
aversion and investments in planning and compliance).”163  
What’s more, the ex-post costs augment in PAGA cases because 
they are lengthy, complex suits,164 and progress further into 
litigation than a parallel class action that would have already 
been dismissed for failing to meet typical class action 
requirements.  These costs also have an impact on the 
likelihood of a settlement in a PAGA action.165 
4. The Unmanageability of PAGA Actions In State 
Court and the Implications of Unmanageable 
Cases 
These federal court decisions also have implications for 
PAGA representative actions in California state court.  While 
not binding, unpublished federal court decisions are still 
persuasive authority in state court.166  One of the before-
mentioned cases (Plaisted) was recently cited in an opinion 
where the defendant argued the unmanageability of a PAGA 
claim.167  The case was the unpublished decision,168 Nelson v. 
 
Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012)). 
 163.  TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. 
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxx (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 164.  See, e.g., Driscoll v. Granite Rock Co., No. 1-08-CV-103426, 2011 WL 
10366147,  Cal. Super. Ct. September 20, 2011) (adjudicating PAGA action, where 
trial lasted fourteen days and involved 285 exhibits and fifty-five witnesses, 
which included an expert witness using statistical evidence to prove who was an 
aggrieved employee). 
 165.  See Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases For Settlement: Theory and 
Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 22 (1991) (discussing how litigation expenses, 
inter alia, influence the size and likelihood of a settlement).  For how these costs 
influence PAGA actions and increase the chance of coercive settlements, see infra 
Part IV.B.1. 
 166.  Olinick v. BMG Entertainment, 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1301 n.11 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 167.  See Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 
3008663, at *18–19  (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013) (relying on Plaisted when 
reversing the lower court’s holding). 
 168.  Although unpublished, and noncitable, see CAL. R. CT. 8.1115(a), this 
case is still important because it relied on the Plaisted analysis.  As such, it 
indicates that California courts are willing to follow the federal courts in their 
analysis on this nascent issue. 
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Southern California Gas Company.169  There, a Court of Appeal 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of class certification, but 
reversed its concurrent denial of PAGA representative status 
on the basis of unmanageability; the lower court reached this 
conclusion because individual issues predominated.170 
The Nelson court stated that after Arias, it was anomalous 
that the trial court could deny PAGA representative status 
when individual issues predominated.171  The Nelson court also 
relied heavily on Plaisted’s analysis regarding the 
inapplicability of manageability concerns within a PAGA 
action.172  The absence of any other court dismissing a PAGA 
claim for unmanageability also influenced the judge’s 
conclusion.173 
Following the court’s decision, the defendant’s submitted 
a petition for rehearing174 to the Supreme Court of California 
and an amicus letter in support of petition for review.175  
Although review was denied, these materials set forth: (1) why 
manageability can still be assessed in light of Arias; and (2) the 
potential for abuse stemming from disregarding the 
manageability problem in PAGA actions.176 
The petitioner’s key point is that Arias said nothing about 
manageability; the court merely held that certifying a class as 
mandated by Civil Procedure Code section 382 was not 
required.177  For example, while a defendant should not be 
permitted to contest the inadequacy of a representative,178 the 
 
 169.  Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, (No. B238845), 2013 WL 
3008663 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 170.  Id. at *19 (reversing the lower court’s decision which held that the 
individual issues predominated, thus making the case unmanageable). 
 171.  Id. at *16. 
 172.  Id. at *18. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, Nelson v. Southern California 
Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 
2013). 
 175.  See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Nelson v. 
Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. 
App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 176.  See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–6, 
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at 
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 177.  See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *2, Nelson v. Southern 
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2 
Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 178.  See generally 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY 
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presence of numerous individual issues based on extensive 
records of declarations and depositions should not prevent the 
court from rendering a PAGA group trial unmanageable.179  In 
other words, “Arias . . . did not hold that an unmanageable 
case becomes triable simply because counsel affixes the label 
‘PAGA’ to it.”180 
The argument in the Amicus letter struck a different vein: 
it focused on the negative implications that would result if 
courts ignored manageability in PAGA suits.181  For one, strike 
suits182 leading to “blackmail” settlements will be encouraged 
if a case must proceed to summary judgment and/or trial 
regardless of unmanageable individualized issues.183  That is, 
a defendant would rather settle than continue litigating the 
expensive claim.184 
The possibility of a meritless claim leading to a settlement 
increases in PAGA actions for two reasons: (1) they are 
commonly joined with class actions; and (2) PAGA contains a 
 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1765 (3d ed. 2010) (“[T]he adequacy 
of representation requirement is . . . of critical importance in all class actions and 
the court is under an obligation to pay careful attention to the . . . prerequisite in 
every case.”). 
 179.  See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *2, Nelson v. Southern 
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2 
Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 180.  See Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing, at *9–10, Nelson v. Southern 
California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 (Cal. App. 2 
Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 181.  See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–5, 
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at 
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 182.  “A strike suit is defined as litigation, usually based on no valid claim, 
brought either for nuisance value or to obtain a settlement.”  Joshua D. Fulop, 
Agency Costs and The Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous Litigation Through 
Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 215 (2007) (quoting Erica 
Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global 
Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 177 n.202)). 
 183.  See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *2, 
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at 
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 184.  A “blackmail” settlement is a settlement in which “the defendant is 
bludgeoned into settling cases for more than they are worth.”  Bruce Hay & David 
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality 
and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1378 (2000).  See also Milton Handler, 
The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The 
Twenty Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any 
device which is workable only because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and 
expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form 
of legalized blackmail.”). 
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penalty scheme allowing for a large amount of liability to be 
imposed.185  The Amicus letter provides an illustrative example 
of a strike suit in the PAGA context: there are 10,000 
employees in an action that, after four years, proceeds to trial; 
assuming that a violation is found and not fixed, the PAGA 
penalty of $200 per week is triggered; for one employee, a 
potential recovery of more than $40,000 would amount; this 
sum is then multiplied by 10,000 employees, and, the employer 
now faces a litigation risk of $400 million.186  Faced with this 
risk and litigation expense, a settlement for a bargain rate will 
look attractive. 
Another issue involves the terms of the settlement.  With 
the class action claim still joined, the defense will settle the 
majority of the proceeds towards that claim—with the 
plaintiff’s attorney receiving one third of the amount—while 
the PAGA claim will be dropped or settled for a nominal 
amount.  Plaintiffs will favor settling towards the class claim 
because those settlement funds are not allocated towards the 
State of California.187 
To prevent these strike suits, the Amicus letter proposes a 
solution: “If at the time of class certification (and following 
adequate discovery) the trial court concludes that individual 
issues predominate, rendering unmanageable any group-wide 
determination of alleged Labor Code violations, the trial court 
in the exercise of discretion . . . can deny representative 
status.”188  The remainder of this article explains why reaching 
this conclusion is necessary in PAGA representative actions. 
 
 185.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014).  Subsection(f)(2) provides 
for a civil penalty of $100 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the 
initial violation and $200 for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each 
subsequent violation. The “per pay period” scheme allows PAGA civil penalties to 
accrue up until trial. 
 186.  See Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–4, 
Nelson v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at 
*19 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
 187. Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *3–4, Nelson 
v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). See also Aoyagi & Pallanch, supra note 6 
(arguing that there is incentive to settle towards the class claim). 
 188.  Brief for CELC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at *5, Nelson 
v. Southern California Gas Company, No. B238845, 2013 WL 3008663, at *19 
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. June 10, 2013). 
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II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM  
The current state of PAGA representative actions leaves 
much uncertainty and liability for employers litigating any one 
of the numerous Labor Code violations in which PAGA 
applies.189  The uncertainty stems from the inconsistent 
application of: (1) Rule 23 to PAGA claims; and, more 
importantly, (2) the Arias court’s holding that PAGA 
representative actions do not need to meet class action 
requirements.  These two concerns dovetail into one mass of 
confusion for employers regarding what they must do to obtain 
a dismissal of a large—and potentially unmanageable—PAGA 
representative action. 
While at least two California district courts would hold 
that class action-sized PAGA groups are unsusceptible to the 
manageability concerns,190 others are beginning to recognize 
the inherent manageability problems with PAGA claims, and 
thus, the undesirability of a trial on such claims.191  However, 
without guidance from the California Supreme Court or the 
9th Circuit, California’s lower courts will continue to draw 
upon class action concepts to dismiss PAGA representative 
claims, which seemingly conflicts with Arias.  Alternatively, if 
Arias is rigidly followed, the possibility of “blackmail” 
settlements through the use of strike suits remains.  Therefore, 
it is up to the courts, or legislature, to clarify the limits of Arias, 
and articulate a test that can correctly identify the point in 
which a court must dismiss an unmanageable PAGA action. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. It is Permissible for California Courts to Dismiss 
PAGA Representative Actions as Unmanageable 
1. Dismissing a PAGA Suit as Unmanageable Does 
Not Conflict With Arias v. Superior Court 
Arias held that in a PAGA representative action, a 
Plaintiff does not need to satisfy the requirements of California 
Code of Civil Procedure section 382.192  This is not equivalent 
 
 189.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 190.  See supra notes 150–62 and accompanying text. 
 191.  See supra notes 135–48 and accompanying text. 
 192.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 935 n.5 (Cal. 2009). 
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to holding that PAGA plaintiff’s do not need to satisfy any type 
of inquiry associated with class actions—i.e., manageability.  
Notably, Arias did not mention manageability once in its 
opinion.193 
The early California class action cases dismissing for lack 
of manageability do not appear to consider it a requirement.194  
It is a distinct conclusion reached upon failing to satisfy the 
other concrete requirements of section 382: community of 
interest, ascertainable class, and superiority.  The applicability 
of the manageability inquiry to each of these prongs195 also 
supports the conclusion that it is not a traditional 
“requirement” falling within the purview of the Arias 
holding.196  Lastly, Blue Chips dismissed an unmanageable 
class action using a balancing test that is arguably 
unconnected to the traditional elements of section 382.197 
These cases, in conjunction with the Arias opinion failing to 
mention manageability once, give rise to an inference that 
Arias did not intend to relieve plaintiffs of establishing a 
manageable class exists.  
Further, Section 382 of California’s Code of Civil 
Procedure fails to make any mention of manageability as a 
requirement; this is in contrast to Rule 23 and the statutes 
from thirty other states, which include manageability in their 
provisions.198 This absence also supports the conclusion that 
manageability is not a strict requirement of §382, but instead, 
a consideration in all class actions, and an available option 
 
 193.  See Arias, 209 P.3d 923 (Cal. 2009). 
 194.  See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
 195.  See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 196.  See Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 
1304–305 (9th Cir. 1990) (considering the manageability in notifying class 
members of the suit, which is part of the “ascertainable class” requirement); 
Dunbar v. Albertson’s, Inc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1432 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(considering the manageability in determining individualized issues of liability, 
as part of the predominance requirement); 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA 
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:72 (5th ed. 2011) 
(explaining that “[manageability] is the most critical concern in determining 
whether a class action is a superior means of adjudication.”). 
 197.  See Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 
1274 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the Blue Chips weighing of class actions 
benefits and burdens is not just a requirement, but an underlying admonishment 
by the supreme court). 
 198.  See Erbsen, supra note 15, at 1056–57 and nn. 118–21 (examining all of 
the states class action statutes and noting that California is in the minority of 
states that has not adopted a manageability rule in its statute). 
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when other requirements are not satisfied.199 Dismissing 
PAGA actions for lack of manageability should not be in 
conflict with Arias’ admonishment that a Plaintiff does not 
meet class certification requirements.   
2. The Court Has The Inherent Ability to Dismiss 
Unmanageable PAGA Claims 
The court’s ability to manage its docket becomes important 
when dealing with PAGA claims because the strict class action 
requirements do not apply, and because of the little amount of 
case law related to the proper treatment of PAGA cases.200  
Thus, the fundamental principles mentioned in Cottle v. 
Superior Court are important in preventing a PAGA action 
from becoming a back door to a class action case—and 
eventually a class settlement.201  Indeed, cases such as Ortiz, 
Litty and Rix—and their dismissal of the PAGA claims for 
unmanageability—illustrate that courts have discretion to 
create workable solutions when faced with cases threatening 
the manageability of their docket.202 
Although these three cases were in federal court, the 
inherent ability of courts to manage their caseload, as stated 
in Cottle, extends to California state court.203  Those 
fundamental principles should apply to potentially 
unmanageable cases.  To fail to do so would ultimately result 
in burdening the trial court’s resources with complex and 
expensive litigation.204 
3. Federal District Courts in California Are 
Instructive on the Issue of Manageability and 
Should be Followed in California State Court 
Even if the manageability assessment is not considered 
 
 199.  See supra notes 114–18. 
 200.  Sonne & Jackson, supra note 7, at 7. 
 201.  See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.  See also Sonne & 
Jackson, supra note 7, at 7. 
 202.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. 2-12-05859 EDL, 2014 
WL 117614, *at 3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (dismissing PAGA claim as 
unmanageable because multitude of individualized assessments would be 
necessary). 
 203.  See Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1377 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(“California courts have fashioned new forms of procedure when required . . . to 
manage the caseload of the court.”) (emphasis added). 
 204.  See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. 
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exempt from Arias’ holding, and the court’s inherent power to 
dismiss for PAGA actions is unpersuasive, dismissing a 
resource draining PAGA action is still advisable. 
Although unpublished, Ortiz, Rix and Litty are persuasive 
authority in California state court.205  The only cases going the 
other way were Echavez & Plaisted, with the latter stating: “To 
hold that a PAGA action could not be maintained because the 
individual assessments regarding whether a violation had 
occurred would make the claim unmanageable at trial would 
obliterate [PAGA’s] purpose, as every action requires some 
individualized assessment  . . . .”206  
The difference in result may be explained by 
distinguishable facts and the procedural posture of Plaisted.207  
The Plaisted plaintiff not only failed to file a class action, but 
also failed to provide the court with a complete evidentiary 
record.208  Conversely, in Ortiz and Litty the court had 
previously ruled that the plaintiff was unable to prove her class 
claims with common proof, and that individualized 
assessments were required to determine liability as to every 
other employee in the representative group.209 
As such, the absence of a detailed record evidencing the 
numerous individualized assessments—which were necessary 
to determine liability—may explain the Plaisted court’s 
reluctance to dismiss the PAGA claim because of 
 
 205.  Olinick v. BMG Entertainment, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1301, fn.11 (Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 206.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX),  2012 WL 
4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal.  Sept. 20, 2012). 
 207.  See Defendants’ Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or 
Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV 
14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 5904904, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (No. CV. 
14-0425 PA (PJWx). 
 208.  See Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 
WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal.  Sept. 20, 2012) (“Plaisted failed to seek class 
certification within Local Rule 23-3’s 90-day deadline . . . .”). 
 209.  Compare Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL,2013 
WL  6326743, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (denying class certification because 
there would be many individualized determinations of thousands of employees), 
and Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. CV 14–0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 
5904907, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2014) (denying class certification because “the 
record demonstrates that the variation in how and where the [employees] perform 
their primary duties is fatal to commonality”), with Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., 
No. 2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal.  Sept. 20, 
2012) (“Plaintiff Alexis Plaisted’s deadline to file a motion for class 
certification . . . has expired.”). 
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manageability.210  Had the court obtained such a record, the 
case may have gone the other way because the 
unmanageability of the Plaisted individual assessments would 
have been somewhat comparable to the Ortiz and Litty cases.211 
Further, the only California state court decision at odds 
with Ortiz, Rix, and Litty is Nelson v. Southern California Gas 
Company, which is unpublished.  It has no authority and is 
uncitable.212  Nonetheless, the case is important because it 
illustrates that State courts are willing to follow district courts 
on the manageability issue. 
Nelson relied heavily on Plaisted, but, as mentioned above, 
Plaisted may have come out differently had a record capable of 
adequately establishing the manageability problems been 
available.213  Moreover, Nelson noted the absence of any case 
“specifically considering whether the trial court may deny a 
representative PAGA claim on the ground that individual 
questions would make the litigation unmanageable.”  
However, with Ortiz and the multitude of other cases following 
Ortiz, this is no longer true.  Had those correctly decided cases 








 210.  See Defendants’ Motion To Strike Any Class, Collective, or 
Representative Actions or Claims at 21, Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc, No. CV. 
14-0425 PA (PJWx), 2014 WL 5904904, at *19–20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) 
(“Plaisted might well have been decided differently if, as here and in Ortiz, the 
court had already ruled that the plaintiff could not prove her class claims with 
common proof, and that individualized inquiries were necessary . . . .”). 
 211.  Compare Defendants Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment at 21–23, Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No. 
2:12-CV-01679-ODW(SHX), 2012 WL 4356158, at *2 (C.D. Cal.  Sept. 20, 2012) 
(arguing that the individualized inquiries needed in this case would create 
manageability problems because up to several hundred managers would have to 
testify at trial to determine who was an “aggrieved employee”), with Ortiz v. CVS 
Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2013 WL  6326743, at *11 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 2, 2013) (dismissing PAGA action because individualized assessments 
would have been necessary for thousands of employees, in order to determine who 
suffered labor code violations, and thus, was an aggrieved employee). 
 212.  CAL. R. CT. 8.1115(a) (West 2014). 
 213.  See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Prudential Concerns that would Result if Courts 
Could not Dismiss for Lack of Manageability 
1. The Danger of Strike Suits and “Blackmail” 
Settlements 
The strike suit214 becomes a threat in PAGA actions 
because plaintiffs can avoid the rigors of class action 
requirements.  PAGA’s exemption allows complex 
representative actions to advance through the court system far 
longer than a normal class action— accruing litigation 
expenses all along the way.215  This creates an incentive216 for 
employers to settle even in the face of a potentially meritless 
claim.217  Simply put, the potential risk of litigating a complex 
and large action, involving thousands of employees with many 
individualized issues, becomes undesirable.  This is especially 
true with a PAGA case where penalties can accrue up to the 
point of trial. 
In addition to litigation expenses, the presence (or 
absence) of insurance coverage plays a unique role in the strike 
suit or “blackmail” settlement.  The common form of employer 
insurance, Employers Practice Liability Insurance (EPLI), 
generally does not cover wage-based claims and claims for fines 
and penalties.218  Since PAGA assesses penalties and covers 
many wage and hour statutes, EPLI coverage will not extend 
to almost all the claims brought under PAGA.219 
The unavailability of insurance necessarily puts 
additional risk on the employer because they may be 
personally liable, and simultaneously compels a potentially 
unmeritorious settlement.220  The chance of settlement may 
also increase because the uninsured defendant is less 
 
 214.  See supra note 182 for the definition of a “strike suit.” 
 215.  See Hoffman, supra note 165, at 22 (1991) (litigation expenses are a type 
of transaction costs and include: attorney’s fees, filing fees, deposition costs, and 
witness fees). 
 216.  See id. (explaining why litigation expenses is a factor taken into account 
before settling). 
 217.  Settling a unmeritorious claim for a less than its worth is defined as a 
“blackmail settlement.” See generally Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1378. 
 218.  Marc B. Heath, Employers Practice Liability Insurance: A Practical 
Guide, 25-DEC Vt. B.J. 51, 52 (1999) (discussing what EPLI does not cover). 
 219.  See Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(f)(2) (West 2014). 
 220.  See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of 
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 
371–72 (1991). 
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experienced than a claim adjuster—who would otherwise be 
handling the case for an insured—and more likely to negotiate 
unpredictably, i.e., be “unduly pessimistic, excessively 
cautious, [and] anxious to avoid trial.”221  Therefore, the 
unavailability of insurance for PAGA actions can have the 
deleterious effect of inducing a settlement for far more than it 
is worth. 
The coercive settlement concept is well developed in the 
class action.222  In what has been termed the “blackmail” 
settlement by commentators, the plaintiffs recover more than 
they should, “because the class counsel is able to threaten the 
defendant with a costly and risky trial.”223  The “blackmail” 
thesis has been endorsed in the federal courts, with one Court 
of Appeals noting that it forces “defendants to stake their 
companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by 
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal 
liability.”224 
The possibility of a “blackmail” settlement looms even 
larger in PAGA actions because plaintiffs are not constricted 
by class action requirements, which could otherwise derail a 
large settlement.225  For example, not having to meet the 
 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1377. 
 223.  Id. at 1378.  See generally Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class 
Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–63 (arguing that there 
are four different versions of the blackmail thesis, one contends that blackmail 
occurs because of the undesirable expenses of litigation, while the other three 
posit that these settlements occur because of the consequences of trying the action 
(i.e., bankrupting the defendant)). 
 224.  Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1307–08 (7th Cir. 
1995)  See also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (“[T]he 
suit is exceedingly unlikely to be tried . . . . The case [is] so unwieldy, and the 
stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price that 
reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the 
actual merit of the claims.”) (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (emphasis added). 
 225.  Once a class is certified, the risk-averse defendant is more likely to settle 
unfavorably because liability is determined by a lone jury in an all-or-nothing 
verdict.  The plaintiff bringing a PAGA claim, however, need not worry about 
class certification; thus, the risk-averse defendant is even more likely to settle, 
and settle earlier, because failure to meet the traditional requirements wont 
result in dismissing the suit.  See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 184 at 1391 
(“[C]ertification makes trial very risky for the defendant . . . .”).  If a PAGA claim 
and a class action claim are brought together, blackmail settlements with the 
proceeds going towards the class claim are more likely in California state court.  
There, the plaintiffs need not pass class certification.  In federal court, however, 
class certification must be met before a settlement can be approved.  See supra 
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predominance of common issues of law and fact requirement 
increases the chance that there will be costly individualized 
assessments.  The threat of expensive litigation, combined 
with the unavailability of insurance, will compel settlement for 
many employers and can work as a type of “legalized 
blackmail.”226  However, courts can take the sting out of these 
threats if they start to consider manageability in every PAGA 
action, ultimately decreasing the chance of blackmail 
settlements.227 
2. Purpose of PAGA May Be Undermined 
The legislature enacted PAGA with one purpose: adequate 
enforcement of the Labor Code through incentivizing private 
parties to recover civil penalties by the government.228  Still, 
the LWDA continues to be the primary enforcement agency 
and must be adequately staffed and funded to enforce 
violations worthy of their attention.  To accomplish this, the 
legislature included a provision that allows the state to recover 
seventy five percent of the statutory civil penalties, while the 
aggrieved party only receives twenty-five percent.229 
In enacting PAGA the legislature explicitly recognized the 
fiscal effect that PAGA would have: “increased penalty revenue 
to the General Fund and the LWDA.”230  The recovery of civil 
penalties was much needed in California because “enforcement 
staff for state labor law agencies has fallen drastically behind 
the growth in the labor” market and “the budget picture is 
 
note 187. 
 226.  See Handler, supra note 184 at 9. 
 227.  A plaintiff’s attorney will no longer be able to threaten the possibility of 
numerous mini-trials and individualized assessments that would drain the 
defendant’s resources.  Of course, a plaintiff will incur expenses as well with 
unmanageable actions but the one-way fee-shifting provision eases the burden on 
the plaintiff.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(g)(1) (West 2014). 
 228.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No:2-12-CV-01679-ODW (SHx), 2013 WL 
1441997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 2013). 
 229. The Ninth Circuit has held that in PAGA actions, the State of California 
is the real party in interest.  Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 
1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013).  The 75% is to be used in the “education of employers 
and employees about the rights and responsibilities” under the code, and for the 
enforcement of labor laws. Courts have said that “[t]he relief available is in large 
part for the benefit of the general public rather than the party brining the action.”  
See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 230.  ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 
2 (August 20, 2003). 
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getting worse, not better.”231  The LWDA’s recovery of Civil 
Penalties effectuates the purpose of PAGA through the direct 
enforcement of the Labor Code and in the education of the laws 
more generally.  Unfortunately, when plaintiffs pursue a 
PAGA strike suit as a back-door to a traditional class action 
settlement, both of these goals are undermined. 
This subversion results because a typical PAGA class 
action lawsuit settles most of its proceeds towards the class 
action claim, while directing a nominal amount towards the 
PAGA claim, assuming it is not dropped altogether prior to 
settlement.232  There is a large incentive to accomplish this 
because the plaintiffs no longer have to allocate 75% towards 
the state.  While the plaintiffs and their attorneys benefit 
financially from this, the state emerges as the loser because 
the LWDA’s ability to educate and enforce remains 
unsupported.  The bottom line: inadequate allocations in 
PAGA-class action settlements undermine the entire reason 
PAGA is exempt from class action requirements—its 
fundamentally different purpose as an enforcement action 
designed to protect the public.233 
As mentioned above, settling a representative action 
becomes attractive to a defendant because of the transaction 
costs associated with litigating, and possibly losing, a large 
representative action.  Permitting large settlements in PAGA 
actions with little money actually going towards PAGA234 is not 
appropriate when PAGA’s enforcement purpose is 
substantially undermined. 
Injecting a manageability assessment into PAGA actions 
does not negatively impact PAGA’s role as an enforcement 
action; instead, it draws a line for when an action susceptible 
to coercive behavior can no longer continue in the courts.  It 
seems apposite that such an inquiry be applicable when the 
very reason PAGA claims are not subject to such requirements 
is substantially undermined.235 
 
 231.  ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 796, at 
4 (June 22, 2004). 
 232.  See infra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 233.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 234.  This will only be the case when settlement is reached prior to class action 
certification.  If class certification is not granted, there will be no class action 
claim to divert settlement funds into. 
 235.  See Baumann v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.) 
(“[T]he California Supreme Court has . . . [held] that PAGA actions are not class 
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Purposely settling towards the class claim is not just an 
undesirable possibility; it is a common occurrence in PAGA 
case law and the disparity in allocation is staggering.236  
Recognizing these allocations as askew, some courts have 
denied such settlements.237  Others have found these small 
PAGA settlements reasonable, while not recognizing that it 
may be the high transaction costs—inherent in a PAGA suit—
forcing the defense to settle.238 
3. A Manageability Assessment Can Save Judicial 
Resources 
Pursuing a class action suit greatly conserves judicial 
resources because numerous plaintiffs are able to consolidate 
otherwise disparate claims into a single suit.239  Class actions 
also vindicate the rights of small claimants that could not 
otherwise bring suit because of the expense of litigation.240  As 
mentioned before, courts have denied class action certification 
where individual issues predominate over common issues, 
stating that such situations would not further judicial 
economy.241  Specifically, individual issues give rise to 
 
actions under state law. The court found PAGA actions fundamentally different 
from class actions, chiefly because the statutory suits are essentially law 
enforcement actions.”). 
 236.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Gordon Trucking, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–0324 AWI SKO, 
2012 WL 5364575, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) (approving settlement for 
$3.7 million with $10,000 allocated towards PAGA); Reed v. Thousand Oaks 
Toyota, No. 56-2012-00419282-CU-OE-VTA, 2013 WL 8118716 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
April 8, 2013) (class action settlement approved for $108,624, with $1,500 
allocated towards PAGA penalties); Bolton v. U.S. Nursing Corp., No. C 12–4466 
LB, 2013 WL 5700403  (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013) (approving class action 
settlement for $1,700,000, with $15,000 allocated towards PAGA). 
 237.  Plaisted v. Dress Barns, Inc., No: 2-12-CV-01679-ODW (SHx), 2013 WL 
1441997, at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 2013). 
 238.  See Franco v. Ruiz Food Products, Inc., No. 1:10–cv–02354–SKO, 2012 
WL 5941801 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2012) (holding $10,000, out of $2,500,000, PAGA 
settlement reasonable and citing cases reaching similar results). 
 239.  See Erbsen, supra note 15, at 999. 
 240.  Justice Lewis Kaplan, a reporter to the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when Rule 23 was amended, pinpointed two 
purposes behind the class action device: “promoting judicial efficiency and 
vindicating the rights of small claimants.”  Federal Courts—Rules of Civil 
Procedure—In a Class Action, Absent Members of the Class are not Parties Subject 
to Counterclaims Under Rule 13, 87 HARV. L. REV. 470, 474 n.23 (1973) (citing 
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, in The Class Action—A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & 
COM. L. REV. 497 (1969). 
 241.  7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780.1 (3d ed. 2010) (citing Begley v. 
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burdensome individual mini-trials, which result in “a 
diminution of judicial resources, and thus a reduction in 
judicial efficiency.”242 
The fundamental concern for judicial efficiency should not 
vanish merely because PAGA is a law enforcement action 
diametrically distinct from a class action.243  This is especially 
true when PAGA claims permit one-sided collateral estoppel,244 
a component of the doctrine of res judicata, resulting in an 
additional waste of judicial resources.245  For example, a 
defense verdict at trial would achieve little judicial economy 
because nonparty employees would still be able to bring claims 
against the defendant.  While the Supreme Court of California 
found the one-way operation permissible because PAGA is 
designed to protect the public, its effects must be considered in 
tandem with the other judicial efficiency concerns likely to 
occur in unmanageable PAGA cases.246  Properly assessed, the 
one-way operation functions as an additional, unnecessary 
burden on the efficiency of the courts. 
In sum, PAGA’s role as a law enforcement action—a 
purpose distinct from traditional class actions—should not 
permit waste of judicial resources;247 both are procedural 
mechanisms designed to consolidate actions and achieve what 
individual suits cannot.  The fact that PAGA claims are 
 
Academy Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ga.  2001). 
 242.  Arch v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495 (E.D. Penn. 
1997).  See also Dubose v. City of Morristown, No. 2:07-CV-115, 2007 WL 3125280 
(E.D. Tenn. 2007) (holding that “conducting mini-trials would be disastrously 
wasteful of judicial resources . . . .”). 
 243.  See supra note 235. 
 244.  Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 934 (Cal. 2009) (holding that 
nonparty employees, but not employers, may invoke collateral estoppel, and “use 
the judgment against the employer to obtain remedies other than civil penalties 
for the same Labor Code violations.”). 
 245.  See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability 
Litigation, 209 F.R.D. 323, 349-50 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (explaining that the one-sided 
res judicata effect in this case “leads to the conclusion that class treatment of 
these claims would not be an efficient use of judicial resources”). 
 246.  See, e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014) (dismissing suit because of the 
unmanageability in trying the many individualized assessments). 
 247.  See Reyes v. Macy’s Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(“The purpose of PAGA is not to recover damages or restitution, but to create a 
means of deputizing citizens as private attorney generals to enforce the Labor 
Code.”); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489, 499 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(distinguishing PAGA actions and class actions because only the latter’s primary 
objective is to provide restitution). 
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consolidated to enforce the Labor Code for the good of the 
general public, and class actions to vindicate the rights of small 
claimants,248 should not allow litigation of the former when 
scarce judicial resources would be used inefficiently. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The federal courts in California are split on the 
applicability of the manageability analysis.249  An increasing 
amount of courts conclude that manageability needs to be 
considered and a court should dismiss a PAGA suit when a 
trial would become too complex.250  In contrast, at least two 
have determined that the difficulty in proving individual 
issues in a representative action—involving many 
employees—is not a reason to dismiss or strike a PAGA claim.  
At least one California State Appellate Court has followed the 
latter view.  Because of this dissension, parties are left 
uncertain in a situation where there is much at stake, 
especially for the employer.   
A. California Courts Should Apply a Manageability 
Analysis to PAGA Representative Actions 
Courts assigned to a large PAGA representative action 
consisting of hundreds, or thousands, of employees should 
apply a manageability analysis predicated on California class 
action case law.  In line with Litty and Ortiz, the threshold 
inquiry should consider the presence of individualized issues, 
and how difficult it would be to establish those issues at trial.251  
Once that is done, courts should look to the California Supreme 
 
 248.  See San Antonio Tel. Co., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.R.D. 435, 
441 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (“Rule 23 was originally designed to protect small or 
relatively small claimants . . . .”). 
 249.  See supra Part I.E.3. 
 250.  See supra Part I.E.3. 
 251.  As this article has discussed, the manageability inquiry is part of 
multiple class action requirements: superiority, ascertainability, and community 
of interest—i.e., predominant common questions of law and fact. This comment 
proposes the community of interest prong as the correct framework for analyzing 
manageability for three reasons: (1) the federal court decisions have started to 
dismiss PAGA suits because of unmanageable individualized inquiry; (2) this 
inquiry is the one most likely to cause unmanageability problems in PAGA wage 
and hour claims; and (3) some of the other requirements, such as ascertainability, 
are not as relevant for PAGA because the employees are more easily identifiable, 
thus, limiting the administrative expenses. 
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Court’s Blue Chip decision.252  The court said that 
manageability should be assessed by weighing the “respective 
benefits and burdens and to allow maintenance of the [suit] 
only where substantial benefits accrue to both litigants and the 
courts.”253 
If after weighing the benefits and burdens of trying the 
individual issues the court determines a complex and 
burdensome trial would result—wasting scarce judicial 
resources and draining the funds of both litigants in the 
process—the court should dismiss the case as unmanageable.  
The factors utilized used to weigh the problems individual 
assessments would create should include: (1) who has the 
burden of proof; (2) whether statistical sampling would be 
permissible;254 and (3) the number of employees represented in 
the action.255 
The applicability of the Blue Chip articulation is apt for 
PAGA representative actions because it is not a class action 
certification requirement mandated by statute.  Instead, it is 
an “underlying admonishment the Supreme Court has given 
the trial courts”256 that can be utilized to drive at the heart of 
what manageability seeks to prevent: a representative action 
 
 252.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1976). 
 253.  Id. at 758. 
 254.  See Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 325 P.3d 916, 30–31 (Cal. 2014) 
(“Statistical methods cannot entirely substitute for common proof . . . . There 
must be some glue that binds class members together apart from statistical 
evidence.”). 
 255.  The Ortiz court took into account all three of these factors.  See Ortiz v. 
CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. March 19,2014) (striking PAGA claim because burden of proof was on the 
defendant, statistical sampling would not have been appropriate, and there were 
many employees represented, thus all of these factors made the case more 
difficult to try). 
 256.  Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1263, 
1274 (Ct. App. 1987).  The Reyes and Blue Chip courts considered the articulation 
relevant when dealing with ascertainability and the administration costs of 
establishing the existence and identification of class members.  This issue is not 
relevant for PAGA actions because all of the members are employees and easily 
identifiable.  However, other courts have considered the admonishment 
applicable to class action certification in general, not only in regards to 
ascertainability, see Davis-Miller v. Automobile Club of Southern California, 201 
Cal. App. 4th 106, 115 n.6 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the weighing of burdens 
and benefits outside of the ascertainability requirement, and stating that it is 
something the party seeking class certification must demonstrate in order to 
establish manageability).  See also Pinnacle Holdings, Inc. v. Simon, 31 Cal. App. 
4th 1430, 1435 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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that is not worth the time, effort, and money of the courts and 
the parties. 
Moreover, when courts dismiss for unmanageability in 
this instance, it is not because a PAGA plaintiff has failed to 
show individual questions predominate over common 
questions of fact and law requirement.  It will be dismissed 
because the burdens that would result from litigating such 
individual questions outweigh the benefits that would accrue 
to the parties and the court.  The result: Arias’ holding that 
PAGA suits should not be subject to class action requirements 
is left intact. 
A manageability assessment also prevents the likelihood 
of strike suits and blackmail settlements.257  Looking at the 
burdens and benefits resulting from a multitude of individual 
issues will expose complex suits that could not be conducted 
fairly and efficiently at trial.  Additionally, if settlement occurs 
before class certification, most of the proceeds from PAGA 
claims may be allocated towards class claims.  The LWDA’s 
funding may decrease marginally, but the conservation of 
judicial resources that results from dismissing expensive, 
unmanageable PAGA actions will far outweigh what the 
LWDA would have recovered from strike suits and blackmail 
settlements. 
CONCLUSION 
PAGA was enacted as a unique and creative solution to a 
labor enforcement problem in California.258  It is correctly 
considered different from a class action and, accordingly, 
should not be treated the same.  However, this cannot mean 
that absolutely no class action inquiries should be assessed. 
The manageability assessment is one of these inquiries 
that must be considered.  Simply put, the burdens that result 
from not considering the concept are too great to go ignored.259  
With the application of this proposed assessment to both state 
and federal courts, PAGA will still operate as an effective law 
enforcement action designed to benefit the public; nothing in 
 
 257.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 258.  See supra Part I.A. 
 259.  See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the prudential concerns 
implicated when ignoring manageability—i.e., “blackmail” settlements and waste 
of judicial resources. 
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considering manageability changes this.  But in addition, the 
assessment will work to negate (1) “blackmail” settlements, (2) 
inefficient litigation through unduly complex suits, the waste 
of judicial resources,260 and, (3) uncertainty in the law. 
In sum, without legislature explicitly imposing a 
manageability requirement in PAGA actions, the Blue Chip 
weighing test is an appropriate solution to remedy the before-
mentioned concerns.  Some courts are already on the right 
track,261 but a developed test will expeditiously prevent the 
clog in the judicial system PAGA suits can create.  This test 
will help encourage the filing of PAGA suits that are the most 
meritorious and deserving of justice, while alleviating many 
concerns in the process. 
 
 260.  See supra Part III.B. 
 261.  See e.g., Ortiz v. CVC Caremark Corporation, No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 
WL 117614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 19,2014). 
